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Essential to effective planning in an 
emergency is knowing the scope of 
the disaster, the number of civilians 
who died, and from what cause. 
Yet in the Darfur emergency it has 
proved particularly difficult to affirm 
with any certainty the number of 
people who have perished and in 
what way. The principal obstacle has 
been the government of Sudan. Itself 
directly involved in ethnic cleansing, 
it has prevented compilation of 
credible mortality statistics. While 
the loss of life from the Israeli-
Hizbollah conflict of 2006 was 
precisely determined, thus allowing 
families and communities to mourn, 
there has been a systematic effort by 
the regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir 
to cover up the death toll in Darfur. 
The government of Sudan has 
claimed that only 9,000 have died. 
The UN, however, says that more 
than 200,000 have perished whereas 
Amnesty International estimates 
300,000 (95,000 killed and more than 
200,000 dead from conflict-related 
hunger or disease) and the Save 
Darfur Coalition, an umbrella group 
of NGOs,1 places the total at 400,000.   
This wide range of estimates 
has generated intense disputes 
about how the statistics have been 
developed, time frames used and 
whether all causes of death (killings 
as well as starvation and disease) 
have been included. Deliberately 
underestimating the numbers can 
contribute to international inaction 
but, on the other hand, exaggerating 
death tolls in order to raise the alarm 
can undermine credibility and put 
into doubt all statistics. It can also 
make constructive dialogue more 
difficult and lead the Sudanese 
regime to put further obstacles in the 
way of aid deliveries since it makes 
no distinction between advocacy 
groups and relief suppliers.  
The debate over numbers points up 
the absence both of standardised 
data collection and of an 
authoritative international body 
with the mandate and authority to 
collect and disseminate mortality 
and morbidity data in emergencies. 
Without such a body, different actors, 
whether governments, UN agencies, 
NGOs or experts will continue to 
make their own ad hoc estimates 
of mortality in emergencies, with 
the result that nobody really 
knows the scope of the crisis. 
In 2007, a Health and Nutrition 
Tracking System was set up at 
the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) with the participation of 
UN agencies, NGOs, donors and 
experts in an effort to establish 
standardised mortality and nutrition 
indicators. However, establishing 
an authoritative body within the 
UN is problematic. WHO has 
been pressured by governments, 
particularly Sudan, about its 
mortality studies and has also been 
criticised for not including violent 
deaths and malnutrition-related 
deaths in its Darfur estimates and 
for failing to make guesstimates for 
areas to which it has been denied 
access. The international community 
urgently needs an independent 
centre free from political influence 
that would collaborate with 
the UN and build on the work 
done by SMART (Standardized 
Monitoring and Assessment of 
Relief and Transitions),2 which 
has been formed by a network 
of humanitarian actors to bring 
consistency to the methodology 
used to collect data on mortality. 
Genocide
Not unlike the dispute over 
statistics, whether or not genocide 
was committed in Darfur will be 
debated for a long time to come. 
Those who remain unpersuaded 
that Sudan has committed genocide 
against its African tribes generally 
focus on the legal issue of whether 
it was Sudan’s ‘intent’ to destroy in 
whole or in part a particular ethnic 
or racial group, as required by 
the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.3 They note that the UN 
International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur4 did not find that Sudan 
committed genocide (although the 
commission did not rule it out and 
emphasised that the war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed 
“may be no less serious and heinous 
than genocide”). Nor has the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
accused any Sudanese to date of 
genocide although it has charged two 
with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.5 Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch have 
generally refrained from using the 
term genocide. The complexity of the 
legal issues surrounding the term 
constitutes the main obstacle for 
many international lawyers. They 
point to the International Court of 
Justice’s tortuous 2007 ruling that 
Serbia did not commit genocide in 
Bosnia because there was insufficient 
proof that Bosnia’s Serbs acted 
under Serbia’s direction and that the 
murder of 8,000 men and boys at 
Srebrenica was planned by Serbia. 
As a result, Serbia did not have to 
pay damages, although it was found 
guilty of not preventing genocide or 
punishing those who committed it. 
For many NGOs and experts, 
particularly in the US, there is 
little doubt that the government 
of Sudan and the Janjaweed have 
committed genocide by means of 
deliberate killings, deportations, 
rapes and destruction of livelihood. 
Physicians for Human Rights has 
found “direct evidence of genocidal 
intent” and “strong circumstantial 
evidence upon which genocidal 
intent may be inferred.”6 The US 
government concluded in 2004 that 
genocide had been committed while 
the Parliament of the European 
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Union has called what happened 
“tantamount to genocide.” 
For many American groups, the use 
of the term genocide has proved an 
effective mobilisation tool. Indeed, 
NGO coalitions and student groups 
have found their voice by focusing 
on genocide, and many of the steps 
taken by the US government have 
been the result of their pressure. But 
the term continues to be contested, 
most recently by the argument that 
it no longer captures the reality on 
the ground, which more closely 
resembles anarchy than genocide. 
The conflict, it is argued, is no 
longer solely between Sudanese 
military and the Janjaweed on the 
one hand and African rebel groups 
on the other. Fragmented rebel 
groups as well as Arab tribes and 
militias are now fighting amongst 
themselves, with alliances constantly 
shifting, banditry spreading and 
violence spilling over into Chad 
(although others counter that 
Sudan is promoting the chaos).
The use of the term genocide has 
also been called a political liability, 
with relief groups criticising human 
rights advocates for undermining 
humanitarian operations on the 
ground. The term has been said 
to make the rebels, as well as the 
Sudanese government and the 
Arab militias, more intransigent. 
In fact, sometimes to facilitate 
negotiations with the government 
of Sudan, UN officials have 
downplayed the ethnic component 
of the conflict, emphasising 
instead its environmental roots 
– desertification, ecological 
degradation and water scarcity. 
The debate over genocide has 
detracted from the most salient issue 
– the need to protect people when 
atrocities are committed, whatever 
their legal categorisation. It has 
enabled Sudan and its supporters 
to make it appear that the crimes 
committed are not so serious since 
genocide has not been officially 
determined. Francis Deng, Special 
Representative to the UN Secretary-
General for the Prevention of 
Genocide and Mass Atrocities, 
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persuasively argues that when a 
situation involves massive suffering 
and death like Darfur, attention 
should not be focused on labels and 
legalities but rather on what should 
be done to stop or prevent this. 
The disarray over the use of the 
term genocide suggests the need 
to explore whether it is feasible to 
set up an expert body under the 
Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
to help with determinations on 
whether or not genocide is occurring. 
The mandate of the Special 
Representative does not allow 
him to make such determinations 
and, unlike other international 
human rights treaties, the 1948 
Genocide Convention contains no 
implementation machinery. The 
ICC can find individuals guilty of 
genocide after the fact but a body 
of recognised experts, aided by 
satellite technology, could be tasked 
with making speedy determinations 
of what is occurring, monitoring 
the state’s actions and providing 
guidance on the obligations of other 
states under the convention. To 
be sure, adding a protocol to the 
convention or reopening the text 
would come with considerable risks. 
But the experiences of Cambodia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and Darfur, 
with the debate and uncertainty 
over the use of the term and the 
steps states should take in response, 
point to the need for establishing 
an authoritative mechanism. 
Military vs. political solutions
Many commentators, politicians 
and humanitarians have called for 
military action. They point out that 
over the past four years Sudan has 
broken every pledge to halt the 
violence and understands only one 
language – the credible threat or use 
of force. Without armed intervention, 
they argue, lives will continue to 
be lost in Darfur, while Khartoum, 
awash with oil revenue and arms, 
will continue on its criminal path. 
Former Clinton Administration 
officials – mindful of their failure to 
prevent the 1994 Rwanda genocide 
– are at times at the forefront of those 
urging the US to take military action. 
Opponents of military action often 
point out that due to its tainted 
international reputation the Bush 
Administration could not credibly 
introduce no-fly zones, air strikes 
and non-consensual NATO forces 
into Darfur without significant 
political fallout in the Islamic world 
and elsewhere. In any case, they 
argue, military operations can 
achieve only limited results when 
the problem is primarily political. 
For many relief organisations, 
coercive intervention could provoke 
a backlash and expulsion of 
humanitarian workers, resulting 
in large-scale deaths. Proponents 
of more robust action concede that 
a more proactive approach might 
incite retaliation but maintain that 
it would improve security in the 
long term. Acquiescence by relief 
groups to government-imposed 
conditions is already risking lives; 
the Sudanese government has 
been regularly impeding relief 
deliveries and tolerating or inciting 
increased attacks on aid workers.  
Whatever the merits of the case, it 
has become clear that neither the 
UN nor a coalition of willing states 
is likely to undertake coercive 
military action in Darfur to oblige 
the government of Sudan to disarm 
the Janjaweed and halt its own 
military operations. Darfur is not 
a national security priority for any 
Western state. The US military 
is overstretched in Iraq, NATO 
is engaged in Afghanistan, and 
Sudan can rely upon China, Russia 
and the Arab League to shield it 
from robust international action. 
A more realistic option
Far better than debating military 
action would be to mount a 
broad-based diplomatic offensive 
to secure the implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 1769.  
Unanimously adopted at the end 
of July 2007, SCR1769 provides for 
a 26,000 strong African Union-UN 
force (the African Union/UN Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur – UNAMID), 
to protect IDPs, civilians and 
humanitarian workers.7 Although 
not the robust international force 
originally called for, UNAMID’s 
Chapter VII mandate8 should – if 
countries pledge sufficient military 
personnel and funding – be an 
improvement over the current small 
AU force of 7,000 with its weak 
protection mandate. The lack of 
resources available to the current 
African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS)9 was tragically evidenced 
in September by the death of ten 
AMIS soldiers whose base at 
Haskanita in South Darfur was 
overrun by unidentified militias.
The time frame for deploying 
UNAMID needs to be speeded up, 
equipment and training provided, 
and flexibility introduced with 
regard to Sudan and the AU’s 
insistence on predominantly 
African troops and police. Since the 
resolution includes no sanctions in 
the event Sudan should obstruct 
deployment, a coalition of 
governments, including African and 
Arab states and regional bodies, 
is needed to systematically prod 
Sudan with both sanctions and 
incentives to allow in the force and, 
most importantly, to reach a political 
agreement with the rebels, as called 
for in the resolution. China will need 
to be encouraged to use its leverage 
with Sudan, while rebel groups will 
need to be pressed to negotiate and 
compromise as well. After all, the 
much-touted responsibility to protect 
(R2P) means not only military action 
but also a series of diplomatic, 
humanitarian, political and economic 
steps to take prior to coercive action. 
One small step forward would be to 
strengthen the offices of the soon-
to-be-appointed Special Adviser 
to the UN Secretary-General on 
the Responsibility to Protect and 
the Special Representative for the 
Prevention of Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities. Both need staff, resources 
and political support, from outside 
and inside the UN, in order to map 
out and raise awareness of the 
steps needed for prevention and to 
operationalise R2P both for Darfur 
and other serious situations. 
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